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Abstract
There is much evidence that less democratic countries experience more high-
frequency growth volatility. In this paper we report a similar finding about volatil-
ity in the medium term: we find evidence that reversals of trend-growth are sharper
and more frequent in non-democracies. Motivated by this evidence, we construct
a model in which non-democracies have high barriers of entry for new firms. This
leads to less sectoral diversification and so, in an uncertain environment, to larger
growth swings in less democratic countries. We present empirical evidence that
confirms the positive relation between democracy and industrial diversification.
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2Economists have always been interested in the relation between long-run economic out-
comes and democracy. Evidence of democracy’s direct impact on growth is mixed (Pers-
son and Tabellini, 2006), but there exists strong evidence that democratic countries are less
volatile (Rodrik, 2000). The existing literature usually measures volatility of per-capita GDP
growth as the standard deviation of annual growth rates. However, recently researchers have
begun paying more attention to large shifts in trend-growth (Pritchett, 2000; Hausmann
et al., 2005; Jerzmanowski, 2006a; Jones and Olken, 2008). This new literature focuses on
medium-term changes in growth. For example, Hausmann et al. (2005) find many episodes
of growth accelerations during 1950-2000, even in countries that have under-performed dur-
ing this period in terms of average growth. Of course, low average long- term growth coupled
with periods of fast growth implies that there must also be offsetting periods of stagnation
or even negative growth. While this research is not directly motivated by standard growth-
volatility questions, it suggests that much of the volatility of the growth process, especially
for developing countries, comes from medium-term changes in the trend rather than from
high frequency shocks; i.e., there is a lot of “trend volatility.”1
In this paper, we ask whether trend-volatility is lower in more democratic countries. That
is, unlike the existing literature on volatility and democracy, we do not measure volatility as
the standard deviation of annual growth rates, which confounds business-cycle fluctuations,
crises, and changes in the trend. Instead, we identify and study patterns in changes to only
the trend (growth accelerations and slowdowns) and ask whether these patterns depend on
the level of democracy.2
We start by identifying and documenting structural breaks in the growth process using
two alternative statistical approaches. Next we analyze the patterns in trend-growth changes.
In particular, we estimate: (i) how the magnitude of trend-growth changes varies with the
degree of the country’s democracy, and (ii) whether democracy affects the likelihood of
experiencing large trend-growth swings.
We find evidence of frequent medium-term reversals of growth; that is, periods of excep-
tionally high growth are, on average, followed by periods of exceptionally low growth, and
vice versa. This is a different phenomenon from regression to the mean, whereby very high
growth is followed by slower growth and very low growth is followed by faster growth as
the process converges to some long-run equilibrium growth rate. What we observe is that
1Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) argue that trend volatility helps explain some of business cycle characteristics in emerging
economies.
2Some papers attempt to separate out crises – episodes of large output drop – from cyclical volatility around the trend
(Acemoglu et al., 2003; Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2005), but they do not consider changes in trend-growth.
3growth rates are not monotone; rather, they cycle between high and low (or even nega-
tive) values. We also find that the propensity to experience large swings of trend-growth is
not uniform across countries – less democratic countries are more susceptible to it. When
compared with factors commonly associated with volatility, such as measures of quality of
institutions, macroeconomic policies, and financial development, as well as income level, we
find that democracy is the most robust predictor of a country’s propensity for growth rever-
sals. Finally, we test whether our results can be explained by the fact that countries which
rely heavily on natural resources tend to be less democratic and also exposed to large shocks
(in the form of large swings of world prices of the resources they export). While shocks to
prices of natural resources appear to contribute to the propensity for growth reversals, they
do not account for the effect of democracy.
Motivated by these findings, we present a model of democracy and diversification with
risky technologies. We show that non-democracies, with higher barriers to entry of new firms,
suffer from greater sectoral concentration and experience (infrequent but large) up-and-down
cycles, i.e., episodes when a period of very fast growth is followed by a decline or a severe
slowdown. This is the only model that we are aware of that explains non-democracies’
high propensity for both growth disasters and spectacular growth accelerations. Besides
explaining our main findings, the model also predicts that non-democracies will be less
diversified and that barriers to entry of new firms will be at least partly responsible for the
medium-term growth reversals we document. We provide evidence consistent with both of
these predictions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews the literature related to our
work. The data, structural break detection, and our main empirical findings are described
in Section 2. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. The main tests of the theory are
displayed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
1. Related Literature
Our paper relates to several branches of the literature. First, it contributes to the rel-
atively unexplored study of within-country variation in growth. One of the first papers to
formally consider this variation is Easterly et al. (1993). They show that growth rates are
not highly correlated across decades, indicating that growth is not very persistent, unlike
many growth ”fundamentals” (institutions, policies, education, etc.). Pritchett (2000; 2006)
observes that in most developing countries, a single time trend does not accurately character-
ize the evolution of GDP per capita.3 Hausmann et al. (2005) look for growth accelerations
3The impact of democracy and different macro policies on the probability of switching between regimes of fast growth and
4during 1950-2000 and find many such episodes, even in countries that have under-performed
during this period in terms of average growth. Jones and Olken (2008) extend their analysis
to include both accelerations and decelerations in growth experiences. They identify growth
transitions using the Bai-Perron test, an approach we follow in this paper, and decompose
them into transitions of physical capital accumulation and total factor productivity growth.4
Second, we contribute to the literature on democracy and volatility. Several papers doc-
ument that non-democracies experience more growth volatility (Rodrik, 1997, 2000; Quinn
and Woolley, 2001; and Mobarak, 2005). Most papers in this literature measure volatility
as the standard deviation of annual growth in GDP per capita, which does not allow one
to distinguish between medium-term trend changes and high-frequency fluctuations.5 Given
the new evidence showing that trend-breaks are frequent, we investigate the relation between
democracy and this aspect of volatility. A related approach is taken by Rodrik (1999), who
shows that the growth slowdowns of the 1970s were larger in non-democracies. However, he
allows for only one (and usually negative) trend-break per country and so does not study
growth accelerations, which we find are common and large among non-democracies.
Third, the relation between barriers to entry and aggregate economic outcomes has been
studied theoretically by Parente and Prescott (1994; 1999), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996),
and Galor et al. (2006), among others. On the empirical side, Djankov et al. (2002) study
barriers to entry across a wide sample of countries. Among other results, they present
evidence that costs of entry for new firms are lower in democracies.6 We use this finding,
which finds a theoretical explanation in Acemoglu (2008), as the starting point of our model
of industrial concentration and democracy, which we use to explain growth reversals.
Finally, the model we propose also relates to the literature on diversification and growth.
Our setup closely follows Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), but it introduces different political
regimes. Koren and Tenreyro (2007a) study possible explanations of the stylized fact that
less developed countries are more volatile than developed ones. One of their conclusions
is that as countries develop, their productive structure moves from more to less volatile.
stagnation is studied in Jerzmanowski (2006b). Among other findings, this paper reports that democracy has a moderating
effect on the growth process; it lowers the propensity for crises but also limits the frequency of episodes of very rapid growth.
This result is consistent with the one presented in this paper, namely that less democratic countries are more prone to growth
cycles – periods of rapid growth followed by an equally dramatic collapse.
4Easterly (2006) also uses the Bai-Perron test to identify episodes of permanent growth take-off, i.e., growth permanently
transiting from zero to a positive value, which he interprets as evidence of an emergence from a poverty trap. He finds very
few such episodes. This is consistent with our findings that growth accelerations, especially in non-democratic countries, are
ultimately reversed. See also Berg et al. (2008).
5One exception is Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005), who show that large crises are an important source of volatility for
developing countries. See also Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
6Perotti and Volpin (2007) also find that countries with more accountable political institutions have better investor protection
and lower entry costs.
5This also occurs in our model, because as countries accumulate more capital, wages and
savings go up and they can afford to open a larger number of risky sectors, and hence
their economy becomes more stable. Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) present empirical evidence
showing that the sectoral concentration follows a U-shaped pattern; i.e., as countries develop,
they first diversify their economy, but later on they specialize again. In our model, the level
of democracy (via the resulting level of barriers to entry) determines diversification. We
provide empirical support for this prediction.
2. Empirical Analysis
2.1. Detection of Structural Breaks
Consider the following simple model
yt = αs + gst+ εt for ts−1 < t ≤ ts,∀t = 1, ...T, (1)
where yt represents the logarithm of real output per worker relative to the United States,
which is taken to be the technological leader. The variable t indexes time, and it is multiplied
by the constant trend growth gs. Finally, εt is a white noise error term.
7 That is, between
two break dates ts−1 and ts output per worker grows at a constant rate gs relative to the
technological frontier. Each time a break occurs, there is a change in one or both of the
parameters – the trend-growth rate and the intercept. We focus our attention on the former.
One could also use the absolute level of output per worker. However, in an interdependent
world, the growth of any individual country depends importantly on knowledge spillovers
from other countries, mainly the technology leaders (Howitt, 2000; Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare, 2005). Growth of individual countries is thus a function of the rate of expansion of
the technology frontier, as well as the domestic policies and institutions, which create or
limit incentives for adoption of frontier technology. We are interested in changes in growth
that stem from changes in the country-specific component of the growth process, and for
this reason, we choose to study growth of output relative to the technology frontier. For
instance, we do not aim to capture growth shifts common to all countries, such as those
following the oil shocks of the 1970s. Instead, our focus is on breaks that drive individual
countries closer to or further away from the world technological frontier.8
7We estimate the model augmenting equation (1) with the lagged level of income on the right-hand side, as well as using
first differences of the equation. However both of these approaches appear to miss many important breaks. Details are available
upon request.
8Using absolute income does not change the qualitative results of the paper. From now on, we refer to ”relative growth”
simply as ”growth,” keeping in mind that all statements are relative to the U.S. Essentially, to convert the numbers to absolute
growth, one should add 2%, which is roughly the average growth rate of the U.S. over the last 100 years.
6The structural break test developed by Bai and Perron (1998) enables us to identify the
break points – ts ’s, as well as the within-regime parameters of the growth process – αs’s
and gs’s. To distinguish medium-term changes in growth from standard business cycles, we
impose a minimum period of ten years between breaks, although the results are not sensitive
to the exact choice of minimum distance between breaks.
We use data on real output per worker from the Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2006)
for the period 1950-2000. We find a total of 208 breaks, which corresponds to 1.8 breaks per
country. Of these breaks, 49% represent increases in the growth rate. Figure 1 shows the
case of Argentina. The Bai-Perron methodology finds two structural breaks. The first break
occurs around 1980, and it corresponds to a large decline in Argentina’s growth rate, which
moves from positive (catching up to the U.S.) to negative (falling behind it). The second
break occurs around 1990, and this time growth becomes less negative without changing its
sign. The graph also shows the confidence intervals of these estimated breaks.
Fig. 1: Argentina’s Trend Breaks
Notes. Argentina’s log real output per worker relative to the US. Bai-Perron break dates are indicated by
the vertical dashed lines. The solid lines show the estimate of the trend part of yt = αs + gst. The figure
also shows the confidence intervals around the estimated break dates.
One concern about the Bai-Perron test of structural breaks is that it relies on asymptotic
properties. Since we use relatively short time series throughout the analysis, one may be
concerned about inference based on asymptotic results. To check the robustness of our
break detection results, we employ a Bayesian approach based on Wang and Zivot (2000) to
estimate these breaks and compare our results with the ones obtained using the Bai-Perron
method. Our comparison focuses on the years at which breaks occur with each method.
The average difference (in absolute value) between the two estimates is 0.33 years, and its
7standard deviation is 3.23. In 67% of the cases, the break dates are identical, and the
difference is no larger than 5 years 92% of the time.
We conclude from this exercise that the sample size does not significantly affect our results
when we use the Bai-Perron technique to estimate break dates, and so in what follows we
use these dates. We also note that this finding, along with recent Monte Carlo results by
Jones and Olken (2008), can be taken as reassurance that despite possible problems, the
Bai-Perron methodology does quite well when applied to cross-country growth data.
Another concern with measuring growth changes (or with cross-country growth empirics
in general) is measurement error in national output series.9 This is particularly important
for measuring volatility at high frequencies. Our measure of volatility is a medium-term
one: For an episode to be detected as say, a period of faster growth, it takes more than
one unusually high data point. But of course if the measurement error is large enough and,
especially if it is persistent, our procedure could be biased. One may also worry about our
main results if measurement error is somewhat larger and more persistent in less democratic
countries. This is possible; however, we note that one could make a similar argument for poor
countries, and we do not find that poor countries tend to experience more growth reversals.
We do acknowledge, however, that measurement error is a potential source of bias for the
literature studying within-country growth variation, including our paper, and a systematic
study of the robustness of various approaches for detecting growth breaks to measurement
error is needed.
2.2. Growth Reversals and Democracy
Figure 2 presents the smoothed distribution of changes in trend growth at the time of
a break for our entire sample of countries. Clearly, there is a lot of “trend-volatility”, i.e.,
sharp changes of trend growth in both directions are common. Note that the distribution is
slightly skewed to the right (the skewness coefficient is 0.19), indicating that large negative
changes in trends are more common; that is, countries that have been growing fast relative
to the U.S. and catching up following a break often grow much slower and fall behind it.
Figure 3 shows some examples of such reversals.
In the remainder of this section, we investigate quantitatively whether trend volatility
illustrated in Figure 3 is more common and more pronounced in non-democracies, as is the
case with the usual measure of volatility – the standard deviation of annual growth rates.
9For example, Ramey and Ramey (1995) restrict their study to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries to limit the influence of measurement error on their measure of volatility.
8Fig. 2: Kernel Density of Trend-growth Changes
Our first approach is to estimate the following regression
gis+1 = β0 + β1gis + εis+1, (2)
where gis represents the growth rate in regime s for country i estimated from (1). We are
interested in the coefficient β1, i.e., the existence and direction of a relation between pre-
break and post-break growth rates. The basic idea of this approach is as follows. Depending
on the value of the β1 parameter, we can have three interesting cases. First, if βˆ1 = 0 then,
on average, the growth rate before a break does not help predict the growth rate after it.
If βˆ1 ∈ (0, 1) then there is monotonic convergence in growth rates. This is a reversion-to-
the-mean dynamic; i.e., exceptionally fast growers before the break still grow fast after the
break, just slightly less so; in the long run, there is convergence to the steady state. Figure
4(a) illustrates the dynamics of this system for the case where initial growth is above the
long-run equilibrium value. When interpreting the figure, recall that “periods” here are not
calendar years but break dates. Thus growth may remain constant for a long period of time,
but when a break occurs, the adjustment is as illustrated in the figure, i.e., for βˆ1 ∈ (0, 1)
we have a monotonic evolution of growth rates over time.
Finally, if βˆ1 ∈ (−1, 0), the dynamic system is illustrated in Figure 4(b). Here there is also
convergence to the long-run steady state. In this case, however, growth is not monotonic;
it exhibits cycles. Periods of high growth are followed by periods of low or even negative
growth and vice versa, as in the examples of Figure 3. Again, because t is not calendar
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Fig. 3: Examples of Growth Reversals
(a) Monotonic Convergence (b) Cycling
Fig. 4: Panel (a): Monotonic convergence in growth rates (βˆ1 ∈ (0, 1)). Panel (b): Growth reversals
(βˆ1 ∈ (−1, 0)).
time but the time of a break, growth may remain constant and, say, above the long-run
equilibrium value for a long time, but when a growth transition occurs, it is to a rate below
the long-run equilibrium. If the equilibrium growth rate is zero, as in Figure 4(b), then
much of the cycling would be from positive growth to negative growth, with higher positive
growth rates followed by more severe collapses; the economy would go from growth miracle
10
to growth disaster. We refer to the case of βˆ1 ∈ (−1, 0) as growth “reversals” or “cycles”.
Our hypothesis is that the magnitude of the swings in trend-growth depends on the level
of democracy. In terms of the above model, this means that the least democratic countries
would have a large and negative β1, while high-democracy countries would have β1 ≥ 0. To
test this, we allow β1 to depend on the level of democracy and income (to avoid attributing
to democracy the effect of income, as the two are highly correlated). We thus estimate
gis+1 = β0 + β11gis + β12Dis+1gis + β13yis+1gis + β2yis+1 + β3Dis+1 + εis+1, (3)
where yis+1 is the average of (log of) real per-worker output, relative to the U.S. over
the 5-year period prior to the break “into” growth regime s + 1. We take these averages
to smooth out any abnormal change in GDP during the year of the break. Dis+1 is the
log of our measure of democracy. This variable, obtained from the Polity IV database from
Marshall and Jaggers (2002), records several regime characteristics for every independent
state above a half-million total population. The measure we use in the analysis is polity2,
which is an average of autocracy and democracy scores. It ranges from -10 to 10 (-10 = high
autocracy; 10 = high democracy) and includes specific indexes meant to capture constraints
on the executive, the degree of political competition, the legislature’s effectiveness, etc. Here
too, we take the average over the five years prior to the break. Finally, εis+1 is a white noise
error term.
We use several methods to estimate equation (3). We start with a simple fixed-effects
and pooled OLS estimation. The results are reported in the first two columns of Table
1. However, because our regressions include a lagged dependent variable, the fixed-effects
estimation of (3) is inconsistent. To address this, the last two columns use the generalized
method-of-moments (GMM) estimator, one-equation and system, respectively.10
The coefficient on growth before the break is negative and significant (with the excep-
tion of pooled OLS), indicating the tendency for growth reversals to occur at the time of
structural breaks. Additionally, the interaction of growth before the break and democracy
is positive and significant, supporting our hypothesis that in more democratic countries, the
phenomenon of reversals is less pronounced. In contrast, the interaction with income is non-
significant, suggesting that it is in fact democracy, not income, that mitigates medium-term
10Arellano and Bond (1991) derive a GMM estimator that uses suitably lagged levels of the dependent and predetermined
right-hand side variables as instruments for the equation in first differences. In our case, we treat the level of per-worker GDP
relative to U.S. GDP as predetermined, i.e., E(yis−l∆εis) = 0 for l ≥ 1 – that is, we allow for the correlation of y with
past shocks to g but rule out correlations with future and contemporaneous shocks. We also assume no serial correlation in ε.
Blundell and Bond (1998) extend this method to a system GMM estimator, where lagged first differences are used to instrument
in addition to an equation in levels – this is the system GMM estimator reported in the last column.
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Table 1: Magnitude of Growth Reversals
Fixed Effects Pooled OLS GMM System GMM
Growth before Break -1.103*** -0.453 -1.157*** -0.992***
(0.332) (0.320) (0.361) (0.323)
Democracy × Growth Before Break 0.485* 0.573** 0.764* 1.014***
(0.265) (0.258) (0.398) (0.329)
Democracy × Income -0.184 -0.050 -0.182 -0.154
(0.194) (0.080) (0.177) (0.138)
Initial Income -0.014 0.002 -0.011 0.003
(0.017) (0.003) (0.034) (0.007)
Democracy -0.028 0.000 -0.014 -0.005
(0.019) (0.009) (0.016) (0.014)
Hansen p-value 0.20 0.26
R2 0.49 0.15
N 197 197 95 197
Notes. Estimates of equation (3). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
cycles. Finally, note that the Hansen test in the last two columns indicates that one cannot
reject the hypothesis that the instruments used are valid.
The magnitude of the estimated effect of democracy is large. At the highest level of
democracy (western democracies) the total coefficient on pre-break growth is -.18 compared
with, for example, -.65 at the level of democracy in 1980 in Argentina, a country that was
ruled by a military dictatorship in that year. This is a large difference in the slope of the
line in Figure 4(b), implying much larger trend volatility for Argentina than for western
democracies.
Because the observations used in the above regression are estimates from the first stage
(Bai-Perron estimation), one may worry about the magnitude of the standard errors in the
second-stage regression. To account for this, we bootstrap the standard errors by sampling
(with replacement) from our original sample of countries and re-estimating each equation
10,000 times. We then use the standard deviation of the resulting estimates as the standard
errors. The results are displayed in Table 2. With the exception of the interaction term in
the FE estimation, all parameters retain significance at conventional levels.
We conclude from this exercise that there is strong evidence in favour of our hypothesis
that less democratic countries experience significant growth reversals. This new finding is
not driven by the methodology used nor by the fact that we use estimates from our first
12
Table 2: Magnitude of Growth Reversals (Bootstrapped)
Fixed Effects Pooled OLS GMM System GMM
Growth before Break -1.103* -0.453 -1.157** -0.992*
(.613) (.377) (.587) (.576)
Democracy × Growth Before Break 0.485 0.573** 0.764* 1.014**
(.456) (0.258) (.471) (.451)
Democracy × Income -0.184 -0.050 -0.182 -0.154
(.207) (.100) (.223) (.183)
Notes. Estimates of equation (3) with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
stage in our dynamic regression.
The above approach relies on estimating the magnitude of growth swings and its relation
to democracy. Alternatively, we can classify some episodes as reversals (large swings in
trend growth) and estimate the probability that they occur as a function of democracy.
The definition we adopt is that a break is a reversal if growth goes from above (below)
the country’s average growth during the sample period to below (above) average. As an
alternative, we also define a reversal as a break when growth changes its sign (i.e., goes from
positive to negative or the reverse). Having classified each break, we use a probit regression
to estimate the probability that a country undergoes a growth reversal as a function of its
democracy score and income level. The probit results are shown in Table 3. Panel A shows
the results for the change-of-sign definition, while in Panel B we use the above/below average
definition. For each definition, we run four specifications. Our main specification (column 1)
is a pooled probit with year effects. As is well known, a fixed effects estimation in a probit
leads to inconsistent estimates of all parameters (Wooldridge 2002), so we instead report
random effects probit estimates (column 2). We repeat both estimations with a time trend
instead of year effects in columns 3 and 4.
The effect of democracy is negative across all specifications and, except in column 1 of
Panel B, quite precisely estimated. Notice that income seems to lack any explanatory power
for growth reversals; that is, more democratic countries are less likely to experience large
trend-growth rate swings, while, conditional on democracy, richer countries are not.
There is a well-known argument that countries which rely heavily on natural resources
tend to be less democratic (see Tsui, 2008 for an empirical analysis for the case of oil). If
this is indeed the case, and given the fact that world prices of most natural resources tend to
fluctuate a lot, one could expect to find that less democratic countries undergo large growth
13
Table 3: Probability of Growth Reversals.
Pooled RE Pooled RE
Panel A: Cycles +/-
Democracy -0.232** -0.241* -0.196** -0.209**
(0.114) (0.124) (0.097) (0.106)
Income 0.038 0.034 0.041 0.041
(0.090) (0.103) (0.082) (0.092)
N 367 625 625 625
Panel B: Cycles above/below
Democracy -0.172 -0.172*† -0.166* -0.166*
(0.111) (0.106) (0.093) (0.089)
Income 0.057 0.057 0.043 0.043
(0.085) (0.090) (0.078) (0.078)
N 364 625 625 625
Time Effects YES YES NO NO
Trend NO NO YES YES
Notes. Probit Regressions. Panel A: change-of-sign definition, Panel B: above/below long run trend defini-
tion; pooled and random effects (RE) estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *† p < 0.12 , *p < 0.10,
**p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
swings. To test this possibility, we again use the probit model, but we extend the specification
to include two natural resource-related variables. First, we control for oil exports by including
an oil-exporter dummy. Next, we add a variable that measures the absolute value of the
change in the price of a country’s main natural resource exports. Specifically, we use the
change in (log) 5-year moving average of the weighted average price of 13 commodities, with
the weights being their shares in the country’s GDP.11
Controlling for oil exporters in Table 4 does not change the result, and the oil dummy
itself does not appear to matter for propensity to experience growth reversals. Commodity
price shocks, in contrast, as can be seen in Table 5, seem to hold some explanatory power
for large growth swings; however, they do not eliminate the effect of democracy. Thus
11The fuel exporter dummy (mainly oil) comes from the World Bank Research Datasets (Social Indicators and Fixed Factors
available at http://econ.worldbank.org). The commodities used in the second control are hard and brown coal, oil, bauxite,
copper, gold, iron, nickel, lead, phosphate, silver, tin, and zinc. See Bolt et al. (2002) for more details.
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Table 4: Probability of Growth Reversals, Controlling for Oil Exporters
Pooled RE Pooled RE
A: Reversals +/-
Democracy -0.237* -0.209** -0.245* -0.223**
(0.122) (0.105) (0.129) (0.111)
Income 0.042 0.052 0.038 0.052
(0.093) (0.084) (0.108) (0.095)
Oil -0.045 -0.125 -0.045 -0.140
(0.327) (0.305) (0.376) (0.338)
N 367 625 625 625
B: Reversals above/below
Democracy -0.181 -0.183* -0.181*† -0.183*
(0.118) (0.101) (0.111) (0.094)
Income 0.065 0.056 0.065 0.056
(0.088) (0.080) (0.094) (0.082)
Oil -0.095 -0.160 -0.095 -0.160
(0.334) (0.300) (0.338) (0.296)
N 364 625 625 625
Time Effects YES YES NO NO
Trend NO NO YES YES
Notes. Probit Regressions. Panel A: change-of-sign definition, Panel B: above/below long run trend defini-
tion; pooled and random effects (RE) estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *† p < 0.12 , *p < 0.10,
**p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
while the commonly believed link between shocks to prices of natural resources and growth
volatility also appears to exist in the medium-term, democracy has an independent effect on
the propensity for growth reversals.12
Finally, we present a simple horse-race between democracy and other institutional qual-
ity/macro policy variables. Our left-hand side variable is the number of growth reversals (as
defined in the probit analysis above) experienced by a country during the sample period.13
We regress this measure on the overall number of breaks, initial income, as well as our
12See Dehn et al. (2005) for an analysis of the effect of commodity price fluctuations on short-term GDP volatility.
13We use the above/below average growth definition of reversal here. For the change of sign definition, the results are similar
but less precisely estimated. This is because there are significantly fewer countries that experienced at least one change of sign
growth reversal from which to identify the effects.
15
Table 5: Probability of Growth Reversals, Controlling for Natural Resource Price Shocks
Pooled RE Pooled RE
A: Reversals +/-
Democracy -0.224* -0.230* -0.190* -0.206*
(0.118) (0.137) (0.102) (0.117)
Income -0.016 -0.020 0.008 0.014
(0.094) (0.116) (0.086) (0.102)
Price Shocks 0.157 0.172 0.196 0.210*
(0.127) (0.122) (0.128) (0.112)
N 328 559 559 559
B: Reversals above/below
Democracy -0.217* -0.217* -0.212** -0.212**
(0.116) (0.114) (0.098) (0.097)
Income 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006
(0.090) (0.097) (0.082) (0.085)
Price Shocks 0.144 0.144 0.203*† 0.203**
(0.132) (0.109) (0.125) (0.102)
N 328 559 559 559
Time Effects YES YES NO NO
Trend NO NO YES YES
Notes. Probit Regressions. Panel A: change-of-sign definition, Panel B: above/below long run trend defini-
tion; pooled and random effects (RE) estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *† p < 0.12 , *p < 0.10,
**p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
measure of democracy and the following explanatory variables: rule of law (Law), index of
corruption (Corr.) both from Kaufmann et al. (2003); ethno-linguistic fictionalization (Eth.
Frac.) from Easterly and Levine (1998), the Sachs-Warner openness index (Open) from
Sachs and Warner (1997), financial development (Fin. Dev), exchange rate overvaluation
and average inflation rate from the World Bank Development Indicators (2005).
We include these variables because, besides being frequently used in cross-country growth
regressions (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003), they have also been used in the study of
volatility. Several studies have attributed volatility of output to bad macroeconomic policies
(e.g., exchange rate policies, inflation). However, Acemoglu et al. (2003) show that once
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Table 6: Determinants of the Number of Growth Reversals.
Law Corr. Eth. Frac. Open Fin. Dev. Overval. Infl.
Democracy -1.391* -1.358* -1.338* -1.702** -1.496** -1.465** -1.464**
(0.785) (0.781) (0.766) (0.734) (0.701) (0.714) (0.731)
x -0.005 -0.017 0.022 0.212 -0.250 -0.247 0.040
(0.118) (0.115) (0.323) (0.299) (0.309) (0.313) (0.232)
No. of Breaks 0.458*** 0.456*** 0.456*** 0.420*** 0.464*** 0.476*** 0.478***
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.128) (0.125) (0.124) (0.128)
Initial Income -0.000 0.007 -0.019 -0.023 0.032 -0.057 -0.032
(0.125) (0.130) (0.125) (0.113) (0.115) (0.119) (0.118)
Constant 1.567 1.471 1.680 2.105** 1.511* 2.183** 1.887**
(1.122) (1.186) (1.030) (0.917) (0.841) (0.842) (0.833)
R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.19
N 74 74 72 73 73 63 69
Notes. Cross-section OLS regressions of number of growth reversals on democracy, income, number of
breaks, and a set of variables common in empirical growth studies: rule of law, corruption, ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, openness, financial development, real exchange overvaluation, and inflation. The row
labeled “x” reports the coefficient on the variable corresponding to column heading. Standard errors in
parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
they control for institutions, the effect of policies on volatility disappears. Rodrik (1999,
2000) argues that countries with less internal conflict (e.g., lower ethnic fractionalization)
cope better with adverse shocks. Finally, well-developed financial markets can be expected
to facilitate a reduction in growth volatility (see Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997).14 Since
democracy can be argued to foster many of these outcomes (e.g., by increasing the account-
ability of policymakers and thus eliminating extreme policy outcomes or providing better
conflict resolution mechanisms) we control for each of them in our regressions to help us pin
down the channel through which democracy works. Tables 6 and 7 display the results when
we include each variable in isolation and one additional regressor at a time, respectively.
Many variables have the expected sign (at least when included in isolation – Table 6),
but few are significant.15 More importantly, democracy is always negative and significant,
and the magnitude of the coefficient does not change very much regardless of which ad-
ditional controls are included. We take this as further evidence that countries with more
democratic political systems are less likely to experience large swings in trend-growth and
14Indeed, in the model we propose later, we assume an absence of credit markets because if they existed, agents would
diversify risk and the economy would not experience growth reversals.
15Consistent with Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), financial development, especially in Table 7, is negative and significant or
close to significant, but its inclusion does not reduce the magnitude or significance of the democracy coefficient.
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Table 7: Determinants of the Number of Growth Reversals.
Democracy -1.391* -1.383* -1.497* -1.509* -1.608* -1.645** -1.621*
(0.785) (0.790) (0.852) (0.857) (0.858) (0.815) (0.834)
Rule of Law -0.005 0.125 0.222 0.137 0.300 0.918** 0.961**
(0.118) (0.392) (0.395) (0.432) (0.451) (0.446) (0.460)
Corruption -0.133 -0.168 -0.122 -0.207 -0.670* -0.675
(0.383) (0.381) (0.394) (0.398) (0.391) (0.407)
Ethno-linguistic Frac. 0.061 0.052 0.037 0.060 0.104
(0.333) (0.336) (0.335) (0.332) (0.347)
Openness 0.189 0.160 -0.138 -0.131
(0.373) (0.372) (0.351) (0.366)
Financial Development -0.439 -0.678* -0.662
(0.361) (0.391) (0.397)
Real Ex.Rate Overval. -0.107 -0.167
(0.308) (0.327)
Inflation 0.193
(0.265)
No. of Breaks 0.458*** 0.455*** 0.458*** 0.434*** 0.474*** 0.552*** 0.560***
(0.126) (0.127) (0.128) (0.137) (0.141) (0.137) (0.140)
Initial Income -0.000 0.015 -0.020 -0.029 -0.005 -0.059 -0.096
(0.125) (0.134) (0.145) (0.147) (0.148) (0.154) (0.165)
Constant 1.567 1.423 1.818 1.906 1.901 2.477* 2.689*
(1.122) (1.203) (1.349) (1.368) (1.363) (1.403) (1.480)
R2 0.168 0.157 0.152 0.142 0.149 0.262 0.252
N 74 74 72 72 72 61 60
Notes. Cross-section OLS regressions of number of growth reversals on democracy, income, number of
breaks, and a set of variables common in empirical growth studies: rule of law, corruption, ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, openness, financial development, real exchange overvaluation, and inflation. Standard
errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
that the channel is not through the effect of democracy on some well-recognized determinant
of volatility.
3. The Model
In this section, we suggest a simple explanation for the above findings. We show that a
modification of the Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) model has the feature that less democratic
countries experience growth reversals like those in Figure 3 – that is, periods of fast growth
followed by rapid decelerations.16 More democratic countries also experience growth breaks,
but their magnitude is much smaller, as shown in the empirical results of the previous section.
The idea of the model is straightforward. Capital goods, which are inputs into the final
goods production, can be produced using many risky technologies. The riskiness comes from
16A mechanism similar to the one emphasized here can be found in Koren and Tenreyro (2007b).
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the fact that in a given period, only some technologies or sectors (in the model, literally only
one) pay off. Skilled agents save when they are young and later become entrepreneurs and
invest their savings to produce capital, which they can then rent out. Investing in more than
one risky sector enables an entrepreneur to diversify some of the risk, but it is costly because
there are fixed costs associated with opening up new businesses. These entry barriers lead
entrepreneurs to operate in fewer sectors but allocate more resources to each of them. As we
explain below, following theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, we assume that entry
barriers are higher in non-democratic countries. It follows that in these countries production
is more concentrated: Fewer sectors are operated, but more resources are invested in each.
This generates the possibility of large growth swings. When one of the operated sectors is
successful, the increase in output is very large because a lot of resources are allocated to
this sector. However, there will also be a dramatic collapse when fortunes turn in favour of
sectors that are absent. The low degree of diversification means this will occur sooner rather
than later.
3.1. Setup
There are overlapping generations of agents who live for two periods. There is a measure
L = 1 of two types of agents: skilled (Ls) and unskilled (Lu). When they are young, agents
supply labour inelastically, consume, and save. When they are old, they transform their
savings into capital, using one of the two available technologies, and rent out the capital
to final good producers. Only some agents (skilled) can operate the more profitable (and
riskier) capital-good technologies.
3.2. Production
In the model economy, there is a competitive final goods sector that combines labour and
intermediate capital goods, according to the Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = K
α
t L
1−α, (4)
where Yt and Kt are output and the stock of capital in period t, respectively, and 0 <
α < 1. There is 100% depreciation of capital.
Labour is supplied inelastically by young agents, and capital is produced by a capital-
goods sector using savings of the old. This transformation can be achieved in two ways:
either by investing in a safe sector or by investing in some of the N risky sectors. In the
risky sectors, which can be thought of as entrepreneurial activity, the payoff is uncertain,
but if the project is successful, higher than in the safe sector.
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3.3. Saving
When agents are young, they work in the final goods sector. As workers, all agents are
equally productive irrespective of their skill level. They receive a wage wt, save a fixed
fraction s, and have a linear utility over second-period consumption.17 Saving is thus given
by
St = swt. (5)
When old, the agents transform their savings into capital, which they then rent out to
the final goods producers. They have the following choices available to transform savings
into capital: (1) invest in a safe sector, which transforms a unit of savings into φ > 0 units of
capital or (2) invest in risky sectors which, if successful (e.g., because of a change in terms of
trade, favorable weather shock, etc.), return A units of capital per unit of savings invested,
where A > φ, if operated by a skilled agent and A = 0 otherwise. The evolution of capital
is shown in Figure 5 (µ indicates the fraction of savings allocated to the safe technology)
Fig. 5: Schematics of Capital Accumulation
Notes. Capital from old agents and labour from young ones is used to produce the final goods. A fraction of
the wage proceeds are saved by the young, who then use these savings to produce capital. Capital production
can be achieved through safe or risky technologies.
There is a continuum [0, N ] of risky sectors available, but only one sector pays off in any
given period. If a sector operated by an agent pays off, she receives a return of A on every
17A case with log utility and endogenous saving is presented in the Appendix. As we discuss there, the qualitative results
are similar, but we cannot obtain closed-form solutions for all the endogenous variables.
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unit of savings allocated to that sector. If the sector does not pay off, she receives nothing
from that sector. Thus, a skilled agent wishing to take advantage of risky technologies opens
up a measure n of sectors and succeeds (i.e., one of the technologies operated pays off) with
probability n/N .18 The skilled agent directs a fraction 1− µ of her savings to risky projects
and distributes the resources equally among the n risky projects she operates, with each
sector receiving 1/n of the total savings allocated (1−µ)S, because projects are symmetric.
We also allow resources allocated to risky sectors to be (partially) reversible, i.e., if one of
the sectors that a skilled agent has opened becomes successful, she can transfer some of
the resources from the other, unsuccessful, risky sectors. The total return from a successful
sector is therefore given by
A
(1− µ)St
n
n1−ρ, (6)
where the last term n1−ρ captures reversibility, i.e., the ability to reallocate some of the
savings after the uncertainty has been resolved. A value of ρ = 1 implies no ability to
reallocate (i.e., all risky capital is sector-specific), while a value of ρ = 0 implies no savings
allocated to risky sectors need to be committed before uncertainty is resolved. We assume
0 < ρ < 1.
3.4. Barriers to Entry and Diversification
So far we have followed Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) with some simplification (e.g., linear
utility, exogenous saving). Now we introduce our key modification. Unlike in their model,
our risky sectors do not have a minimum required scale; instead, we introduce entry costs.
This produces similar dynamics, but allows us to appeal to the literature on democracy and
barriers to entry to think about the model’s prediction regarding different paths of output per
capita in democracies and non-democracies. Specifically, we assume that opening up a firm
in one of the risky sectors requires paying an entry cost ψ.19 As we discuss below, this barrier
to entry will be the variable distinguishing political regimes – with non-democracies erecting
higher barriers to entry of entrepreneurs. We have in mind here a broad concept of cost
of entry, including registration and license fees, bribes, time spent on fulfilling bureaucratic
requirements, limited access to public infrastructure, etc. For simplicity, we assume that
18We assume all skilled agents open up the same sectors. This is merely to simplify the exposition. We could justify it by
assuming that sectors are ordered according to complexity and so, on top of the entry barrier introduced below, there is a
higher cost of opening higher-indexed sectors. Since the choice of whether to open a sector or not is independent of the choices
of other agents, this would lead to all agents opening up identical, lowest-index sectors.
19In Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), there is a minimum requirement scale for each sector, leading to investment in a limited
number of sectors. In our model, there are explicit fixed costs that agents must pay before opening sectors. Another difference
between the two setups is that we assume that the fixed cost is the same in all risky sectors, while in their model different
sectors have different scale requirements. None of these differences is crucial for our results.
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this cost takes the form of a reduction in the savings allocated to risky sectors; that is, an
agent who allocates (1− µ)St to n risky sectors only gets to invest (1− µ)St − ψn in actual
productive projects.
Unskilled agents’ entrepreneurial productivity is zero, and thus they always allocate all of
their savings to the safe sector. The skilled agent will choose her allocation, and how many
risky sectors to operate, at the beginning of the second period to maximize her expected
(linear) utility of period-two consumption, which is equivalent to maximizing expected capital
holdings KSt
max
{µt,nt}
E(KSt ) = µtStφ+
nt
N
(
(1− µt)St − ψnt
nρt
)
A. (7)
The first term represents the constant and exogenous return φ on the fraction µ of savings
allocated to the safe sector. The second term is the expected (with probability n/N) return
A on the savings (net of entry costs) allocated per risky sector (with 0 < ρ < 1 reflecting the
degree of reversibility of risky allocations). Given the linearity of the objective function, the
choice of µ will be at a corner depending on the relative values of return on the safe (φ) and
risky (nt
N
A
nρt
) investments. In particular, µt = 0 if Ψ(n) ≡ φ− ntN Anρt < 0 and µt = 1 otherwise
(see Figure 9(a) in the Appendix.) The first- order condition for n can be solved to obtain
µt = 1− (2− ρ)
St(1− ρ) nt ψ ≡ Γ(n). (8)
We also define n¯ = (φN
A
)1/(1−ρ), the value of n such that for any n > n¯ we have µ = 0,
i.e., skilled workers invest all of their resources in risky sectors.
It is easy to show (see the Appendix) that when it is optimal to allocate all resources to
the risky sectors (µ = 0), the optimal measure of them to operate is n∗ given by
n∗ = St
1− ρ
(2− ρ)ψ. (9)
In what follows, we assume that the interior solution, if it exists, is preferred to the corner
solution.20
3.5. Political Regimes
We now introduce different political regimes: democracies and non-democracies. Specif-
ically, we assume that non-democracies have higher barriers to entry into the risky sectors,
20This will be the case for a sufficiently large value of savings (or wage, since S = sw) S >
(2−ρ)
(
N(2−ρ)φ
A
) 1
1−ρ ψ
1−ρ . Also notice
that because n¯ is independent of S and n∗ is increasing in S, the interior solution always exists for high enough wages.
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reflected by a higher value of ψ. This assumption is supported empirically by the findings of
Djankov et al. (2002), who show that there is strong evidence that less democratic countries
erect higher barriers to entry for firms. Perotti and Volpin (2007) corroborate this finding by
presenting evidence that investor protection is worse and entry costs higher in countries with
“less accountable political institutions.” From a theoretical point of view, Acemoglu (2008)
presents a model in which oligarchies block the entry of potentially productive entrepreneurs
in the production sector to keep wages artificially low. In Aghion et al. (2008), democracy
and political rights enhance the freedom of entry into markets in the most technologically
advanced sectors of the economy. In both models, limiting entry leads to stagnation in the
long run, but because of non-democratic governments’ lack of accountability, these policies
persist.
Consider an increase in ψ, the entry barrier. This change makes the Γ schedule steeper
without affecting n¯ – see Figure 11 in the Appendix. This means that an economy with
lower barriers to entry, or a more democratic economy according to our assumption, is more
likely to operate risky sectors and the more democratic the economy, the more risky sectors
are open for a given value of S (and thus wages). This is summarized in Result 1 below.
Result 1: Democracies have a more diversified industrial composition: They open up more
sectors than non-democracies at the same level of development.
We also note that because saving S is a constant fraction of wages, as the economy grows,
more and more sectors will be opened and ultimately, in a rich enough economy, all N sectors
will be operated regardless of ψ.21 However, as we discuss in the next section, a high level
of barriers may limit periods of growth to rapid but relatively short-lived episodes and thus
keep the economy from becoming rich and diversified.
3.6. Dynamics
Consider an economy with n¯ < n∗ < N so that all skilled agents (Ls) allocate the entirety
of their savings to risky technologies. Capital stock evolves according to the following process:
If one of the operated risky sectors is successful, the economy is said to be in the lucky state.
In this state, the capital stock, denoted by KL, is equal to the output of the safe sector
Luswtφ, where all the unskilled (Lu) agents allocate savings, plus the output of the risky
sector LsA(swt−ψn∗(wt))/n∗(wt)ρ . This happens with probability n∗/N . Otherwise capital
21It is important to recognize that we do not argue that certain sectors are completely missing from an economy. Rather we
think of there being traditional (small-scale home-produced, for example) ways of manufacturing a good – which we classify as
safe technologies – as well as modern, large-scale ways, which we model as risky but potentially very productive technologies.
That is, goods produced in the economy without any risky sectors may be very similar to goods produced in the economy which
operates riksy sectors, but they are manufactured using traditional, small-scale technologies not subject to large productivity
gains.
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is KU equal to only the output of the safe sector. Using the fact that wt = (1 − α)Kαt we
have
Kt+1 =
KL(Kt) = Lus(1− α)Kαt φ+ Ls
A(s(1−α)Kαt −ψn∗((1−α)Kαt ))
n∗((1−α)Kαt )ρ with prob.
n∗
N
KU(Kt) = Lus(1− α)Kαt φ with prob. 1− n
∗
N
.
(10)
Notice that, given the previous period’s capital, when a high-ψ economy is lucky, i.e.,
one of the risky sectors pays off, its capital stock is higher, that is dKL/dψ > 0, as long as
n∗ < N . This follows because of a concentration effect : With higher barriers to entry, fewer
sectors are operated but more savings are allocated to each, and as a result, when one of the
sectors operated pays off, the resulting capital good output is higher. To see this formally,
note that the extra capital when the economy is in the lucky state is given by A
(
S−ψ n
nρ
)
and that, from equation (9), the product ψ n∗ is independent of ψ. It follows that, ceteris
paribus, a higher entry barrier – by reducing the number of risky sectors in operation n –
increases capital per sector and thus the total capital stock in the lucky state. Of course, the
probability that the lucky state is lower because fewer sectors are operated and the expected
capital stock is lower in the high barrier economy. This is summarized in the following result:
Result 2: Non-democracies are less likely to have a risky sector pay off, but when this occurs
their growth is higher than in democracies. This happens because non-democracies have their
resources concentrated in fewer sectors.
Using the equation (9) for n∗, it is easy to show that the dynamics of capital can be
represented by the diagram in Figure 6. For any given capital stock, Kt the next period
capital will be given by theKL(Kt) schedule with probability n
∗(Kt)/N andKU(Kt) schedule
with probability 1− n∗(Kt)/N .22 Result 2 above implies that the KL schedule is higher for
non-democracies, but the probability of being on it is lower.
Imagine an economy with a history of always being in the lucky state, i.e., one of the
operated sectors paying off. Such a history is of course very unlikely if ψ is large (and n∗ low
relative to N), but a hypothetical economy that follows it would simply move up along the
KL(Kt) schedule to the high capital steady state K
L. Alternatively, imagine an economy
22This dynamic holds for large enough barriers, so that n∗ < N . To characterize the model fully, we also must consider the
dynamics when n∗ > N and all sectors are operated. In short, what happens is that fully diversified economies converge to a
deterministic steady state, with capital stock inversely related to the level of barriers. Our main focus is on economies that are
not fully diversified, so we restrict our attention to the case n∗ < N . See the Appendix for more details.
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Fig. 6: Model Dynamics
Notes. For any given capital stock Kt, the next period capital will be given by the KL(Kt) schedule with
probability n∗(Kt)/N and KU (Kt) schedule with probability 1− n∗(Kt)/N .
that is persistently unlucky and no risky sectors ever pay off. This economy would follow
the KU(Kt) schedule to the low capital steady state K
U . In practice, an economies’ capital
stock follows a random process, switching between dynamics associated with the two curves.
However, we can expect an average high-ψ country (low democracy) to spend most of the
time around the KU steady state. This leads us to the following result.
Result 3a: A non-democracy will experience infrequent, but large up-and-down output
swings. In particular, there will be infrequent episodes when output increases as one of
the operated sectors is successful and the economy jumps to the KL schedule. This increase
is rapid because a lot of resources are allocated to each operated sector. With high probability,
however, this episode will be followed by a period of decline, as none of the operated sectors
is successful and the economy reverts to the KU schedule.
Result 3b states that an average low-ψ country (high democracy), in contrast, can be
expected to spend most of its time growing and converging to KL. As long as n∗ < N , its
output will occasionally drop, but the decline will not be very large because the KU and KL
schedules are not far apart.
Result 3b: A democracy will experience infrequent and small down-and-up output swings.
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In particular, there will be infrequent episodes when output decreases, as none of the operated
sectors is successful and the economy falls to KL schedule. With high probability, however,
this episode will be followed by a rebound, as one of the operated sectors is successful and the
economy reverts to the KL schedule.
(a) Democracy (b) Non-Democracy
Fig. 7: Medium term growth reversals. Panel (a): Democracy; Panel (b): Non-Democracy.
These results are illustrated in Figure 7. Finally, recall that as an economy becomes
richer, barriers to entry matter less. As described in the Appendix, there is a threshold
level of capital K∗ such that for capital stocks beyond it, all N sectors are open and the
economy is always on the KL schedule and converges to the high steady state. This effect
becomes important once we allow for exogenous productivity growth because then even high-
ψ economies will eventually accumulate enough capital such that they will open all sectors
and will no longer undergo growth reversals. However, if growth of productivity (convergence
to the world technology frontier) is not very fast, this process may take a long time.
Finally, note that in the context of our model, one should be careful a conclusion that
trend-volatility is detrimental to. While it is true that countries with the lowest barriers to
entry enjoy the most stability and are the richest, it is also true that countries with extremely
high barriers to entry are stable – they operate no risky technologies, almost never experience
growth accelerations, and remain in the low steady state. That is, while trend-volatility is a
symptom of an underlying problem (high entry barriers), each episode of an acceleration is
a period during which the country’s fortunes are (temporarily) good.
4. Tests of the Model
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4.1. Growth Reversals
Our model predicts that less democratic countries will experience rapid growth accelera-
tions followed by dramatic slowdowns and vice versa. As we established in Section 2.2, the
evidence is consistent with this prediction: the less democratic the country, the larger the
magnitude of growth reversals at the time of the break and the greater the probability of
experiencing a large growth swing. Figure 8 illustrates this again by showing the (kernel
smoothed) densities of the magnitude of growth changes at the time of the break for democ-
racies and democracies where we draw the line between the two groups at the median of our
democracy measure.
Fig. 8: Kernel Density of Trend-Growth Changes; Democracies vs. Non-democracies.
Clearly both groups experience trend changes, but it is also apparent that for democracies
these changes are usually small (mode close to zero), while for non-democracies they are most
commonly large in either the positive or negative direction (bi-modal distribution), and much
more often very large (fat tails).
That these distributions are consistent with our model is of course not surprising because
our above findings motivated the theory. However, our model also makes a new prediction,
namely that there is a negative relation between democracy and industrial concentration.
We put this prediction to a test in the next section.
4.2. Democracy and Diversification
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In this section, we test the hypothesis that non-democracies tend to be less diversified
than democracies, even when one controls for the country’s income level. The data set we
employ to test the relation between industrial concentration and democracy is the Industrial
Statistics Database (revision 2) from the United Nations, which contains data on manufac-
turing at the 3-digit level of disaggregation for the period 1963-2003. The data set covers 181
countries and 29 manufacturing categories. The outcome variables in which we are interested
are output and value added across different manufacturing sectors.
We start by calculating the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration for each country.
The index for variable j = 1, 2 in period t is defined as follows:
hjt =
n∑
i=i
(
Yijt
Yjt
)2
,
where Yijt is the value of variable j in sector i and period t, Yjt ≡
n∑
i=1
Yijt, and n is the total
number of sectors operating in a given country at a point in time. The Herfindahl-Hirschman
index is bounded between 1
n
and one, with the former representing a completely diversified
economy and the latter representing an economy in which all the activity is concentrated in
one sector. We estimate the following specification:
hjct = α + β1Dct + β2 ln yct + β3 ln y
2
ct + εct, (11)
where hjct is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of variable j in country c and year t. The
variable D is the index of democracy used above, and y is real GDP per worker. We include
the square of log income in our regression to account for the increasing portion of the U-
shape pattern of specialization documented in Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), who show that
as countries develop, their economy first becomes more diversified but concentrates again in
later stages.
We estimate (11) by pooled OLS and cluster the errors by country to account for the
serial correlation of errors within countries. We believe it is more reasonable to omit fixed
effects because we are ultimately interested in comparing the experience of each country to
a common benchmark, the overall average concentration across countries.23 The results are
presented in Table 8.
In each of the four specifications, the coefficient on democracy is negative and significant
at conventional levels, indicating that the manufacturing sector in more democratic countries
23Using fixed effects we obtain similar but less precise estimates.
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Table 8: Democracy and Industrial Concentration
Value Added Output Value Added Output
Democracy -0.159*** -0.166*** -0.111*† -0.121**
(0.052) (0.048) (0.070) (0.061)
GDP p.c. -0.386 -0.623**
(0.269) (0.263)
GDP p.c. Squared 0.019 0.034**
(0.018) (0.017)
Constant 2.880*** 2.739*** 4.629*** 5.402***
(0.136) (0.127) (1.060) (1.037)
R2 0.072 0.084 0.109 0.127
N 2695 2623 2649 2591
Notes. Pooled OLS regression of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index in manufacturing on democracy, GDP per
capita, and GDP per capita squared. Standard errors clustered by country. *† < 0.12, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
is indeed less concentrated than in less democratic ones. The negative coefficient on income
suggests that richer countries also tend to be more diversified, although it is only significant
when we use output to construct our dependent variable. Finally, the positive coefficient
on the square of income – although significant only when our measure of concentration is
calculated based on sectoral value added – confirms Imbs and Wacziarg’s (2003) findings.
Thus, consistent with our model’s prediction, less democratic countries have less diversi-
fied manufacturing sectors, and this effect is independent of the effect of the level of devel-
opment on diversification identified previously in the literature.
4.3. Back to Reversals
Our model suggests that non-democracies ultimately experience more severe growth re-
versals because they erect higher barriers to entry. A direct test of this hypothesis would
involve checking if countries with higher barriers experience larger growth reversals. The
difficulty with this strategy is that we lack data on barriers to entry for a large span of
countries and years. To our knowledge, the most comprehensive data set is the one used in
Djankov et al. (2002), which only covers several years in the 1990s, making it impossible to
run our dynamic panel specification. We can, in a limited way, explore the effects of barriers
to entry on growth reversals using the cross-sectional regression of Section 2.2. Here we
reproduce Table 6, where we regress the number of growth reversals on the overall number
of structural breaks, initial income, and a set of variables usually thought to affect volatility.
Presently, however, we expand the set to include the variable that our model predicts should
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be related to the propensity for growth reversals – barriers to entry. The measure of barriers
is an average of the cost of registering new business, the number of procedures required to
register, and the average time it takes to complete them (from Djankov et al., 2002).
As can be seen in the last column of Table 9, the effect of higher barriers on the propensity
to cycle is positive, although not significant. Interestingly, including this regressor reduces
the size of the coefficient on democracy and renders it nonsignificant, and we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the coefficient on democracy is non-negative (values for this test are in
the bottom row of the table). We do not give this result too much weight because first,
the sample size is reduced significantly when we use the Djankov et al. (2002) proxy, and
second, the barriers we believe are important are much broader than just official registration
costs.24 However, we view the fact that the barriers variable appears to account for at least
some of the effect of democracy as supportive of the channel predicted by our model.
Table 9: Determinants of the Number of Growth Reversals; including Barriers to Entry
Law Corr. Eth. Frac. Open Fin. Dev. Overval. Infl. Barriers
Democracy -1.391* -1.358* -1.338* -1.702** -1.496** -1.465** -1.464** -0.705
(0.785) (0.781) (0.766) (0.734) (0.701) (0.714) (0.731) (0.996)
x -0.005 -0.017 0.022 0.212 -0.250 -0.247 0.040 0.127
(0.118) (0.115) (0.323) (0.299) (0.309) (0.313) (0.232) (0.129)
No. of Breaks 0.458*** 0.456*** 0.456*** 0.420*** 0.464*** 0.476*** 0.478*** 0.463***
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.128) (0.125) (0.124) (0.128) (0.138)
Initial Income -0.000 0.007 -0.019 -0.023 0.032 -0.057 -0.032 -0.062
(0.125) (0.130) (0.125) (0.113) (0.115) (0.119) (0.118) (0.128)
Constant 1.567 1.471 1.680 2.105** 1.511* 2.183** 1.887** 1.327
(1.122) (1.186) (1.030) (0.917) (0.841) (0.842) (0.833) (0.983)
R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.19
N 74 74 72 73 73 63 69 53
Demo. < 0
(p-value) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.24
Notes. Cross-section OLS rregression of number of growth reversals on democracy, income, number of
breaks and a set of variables common in empirical growth studies: rule of law, corruption, ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, openness, financial development, real exchange overvaluation, inflation, and barriers to
entry. Standard errors in parentheses. Bottom rows give the p-values of the test that the coefficient on
democracy is non-negative. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Another, indirect test of our hypothesis would be to check whether countries with a more
24In fact, running the regression without the barriers variable on the same 53 observations also produces a nonsignificant
estimate of the democracy coefficient, though the point estimate is larger (-.95) and the p-value of the test of whether it is
non-negative is 0.16.
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concentrated production structure tend to experience more growth reversals, regardless of
their level of democracy. Unfortunately, it is again the case that the data on concentration
are too sparse (both in country and year coverage) to repeat our two-stage procedure on
the full sample. When we re-estimate the main specification including measures (and their
interaction with growth before the break) of concentration in value added and output, re-
spectively, the sample size drops roughly by half. The results are shown in Tables 10 and
11.
In four out of the six specifications, the estimated coefficients on the interaction of con-
centration and pre-break growth are large and negative (suggesting concentration increases
the size of growth reversals); however, they are also very imprecisely estimated, and they do
not eliminate the effect of democracy. The combination of a reduced sample and the fact
that the Herfindahl index in manufacturing is a noisy and imperfect measure of the overall
diversification of the economy may be driving the results, and clearly, more work and better
data are needed to explore the role of concentration in medium-term growth swings in more
depth.
5. Conclusions
There exists convincing evidence that democratic countries are less volatile than non-
democratic ones. However, this conclusion is usually reached with respect to volatility as
measured by the standard deviation of annual growth rates of per-capita GDP, which includes
both low and high frequency fluctuations. Several recent papers document that significant
changes in trend-growth, such as growth accelerations that last a decade, or similar periods of
negative growth, are quite common (Pritchett, 2000; Hausmann et al., 2005; Jerzmanowski,
2006a; Jones and Olken, 2007). This suggests that much of the volatility of the growth
process, especially for developing countries, comes from medium-term changes in the trend
rather than from high frequency shocks, i.e., there is a lot of “trend-volatility”. In this paper
we ask whether democracy also has a stabilizing effect on trend-volatility, i.e. whether more
democratic countries experience fewer and milder swings of trend-growth.
We find a common phenomenon of medium-term reversals of growth; that is, periods of
exceptionally high growth are, on average, followed by periods of exceptionally low growth,
and vice versa. The propensity to experience large swings of trend-growth is not uniform
across countries – less democratic countries are more susceptible to it. When compared
with factors commonly associated with volatility, such as measures of quality of institutions,
macroeconomic policies, and financial development, we find that democracy is the most
robust predictor of a country’s propensity for growth reversals. Finally, we test whether our
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Table 10: Magnitude of Growth Reversals; including Output Concentration
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects System GMM
Growth before Break -1.083*** -1.355** -1.287***
(0.295) (0.525) (0.353)
Initial Income 0.002 -0.023 -0.001
(0.004) (0.025) (0.008)
Democracy -0.012 -0.036 -0.012
(0.010) (0.024) (0.016)
Democracy × Growth Before Break 0.895*** 0.415 1.002***
(0.213) (0.311) (0.275)
Concentration -0.054 -0.020 -0.051
(0.060) (0.139) (0.064)
Concentration × Growth Before Break -1.493 2.871 -1.979
(1.489) (4.483) (1.829)
Democracy × Income -0.377** -0.130 -0.470**
(0.167) (0.357) (0.232)
Constant 0.018 0.021 0.016
(0.014) (0.053) (0.023)
Hansen p-value 0.65
R2 0.147 0.565
N 114 114 114
Notes. Estimates of equation (3) adding manufacturing output concentration measure. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
results can be explained by the fact that countries that rely heavily on natural resources tend
to be less democratic and also exposed to large shocks (in the form of large swings of world
prices of the resources they export). While shocks to prices of natural resources appear
to contribute to the propensity for growth reversals, they do not account for the effect
of democracy. Motivated by these findings, we present a model where non-democracies,
with higher barriers to entry of new firms, suffer from greater sectoral concentration and
experience (infrequent but large) growth swings. This is the only model that we are aware
of that explains non-democracies’ high propensity for both growth disasters and spectacular
growth accelerations.
Understanding medium-term patterns in economic growth is important. Because trend-
growth changes are frequent and large, they are an important feature of the long-term growth
process. Academics, as well as practitioners of development economics, are increasingly real-
izing the importance of understanding crises and prolonged periods of stagnation (Aizenman
and Pinto, 2008). The literature on growth accelerations, however, finds that periods of
rapid growth are not uncommon even among countries with low average growth rates and
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Table 11: Magnitude of Growth Reversals; including Value Added Concentration
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects System GMM
Growth before Break -0.966*** -1.341** -1.047***
(0.298) (0.563) (0.345)
Initial Income 0.003 -0.022 0.001
(0.004) (0.025) (0.008)
Democracy -0.013 -0.038 -0.015
(0.010) (0.023) (0.016)
Democracy × Growth Before Break 0.929*** 0.397 1.028***
(0.185) (0.330) (0.231)
Concentration -0.023 -0.040 -0.024
(0.039) (0.115) (0.045)
Concentration × Growth Before Break -1.151 1.787 -2.007
(1.054) (3.301) (1.550)
Democracy × Income -0.253** -0.164 -0.306**
(0.109) (0.330) (0.133)
Constant 0.018 0.006 0.020
(0.014) (0.047) (0.024)
Hansen p-value 0.51
R2 0.131 0.570
N 115 115 115
Notes. Estimates of equation (3) adding manufacturing value added concentration measure. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
conclude from this that sustaining – not initiating – growth is the more difficult part of a
successful development enterprise (Hausman et al., 2005; Jerzmanowski, 2006b). It seems
that most countries can achieve growth with a limited degree of reform or policy change,
but the challenge is to understand what makes growth continue. Our results put a different
perspective on these findings. Less democratic countries not only fail to sustain growth, but
also see its fruits undone by large slowdowns or periods of decline that follow their growth
spurts. In fact, the growth spurts themselves can equally correctly be viewed as periods
of successfully initiating growth or as symptoms of the underlying weakness of the econ-
omy which, by limiting diversification, makes large growth accelerations possible, while at
the same time facilitating the dramatic reversals. Here our model suggests that stabilizing
the economy through greater diversification will reduce the frequency of dramatic collapses,
but at the same time make spectacular accelerations less likely. It also suggests to policy-
makers that periods of rapid growth, especially in less democratic countries, should not be
immediately be viewed as achieving lasting success and that perhaps appropriate policies –
foremost, a reduction in barriers to entry – during the boom years could be used to enhance
33
diversification and help the economy avoid a growth reversal. Obviously, more research is
needed to fully understand the mechanism of trend-volatility. Such research has the potential
to not only contribute to our understanding of economic growth but also inform policy in
important ways. As emphasized by Pritchett (2000), from the policymakers’ point of view,
lessons about medium-term growth are likely much more relevant than those about the long
run.
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Appendix
1. The Linear Case
The gap between rates of return, Ψ(n) ≡ φ− nt
N
A
nρt
is a decreasing function of n since, as
long as ρ < 1 , the expected return in the risky sector rises with n. This is illustrated in
Figure 9(a).
Note also that Ψ(0) = φ > 0 ⇒ µ = 0, i.e., it is optimal to invest zero resources in the
risky technology if no sectors are open and Ψ(n¯) = 0 for n¯ =
(
Nφ
A
) 1
1−ρ , which denotes the
indifference point between investing or not in the risky sector. To the left of n¯, return from
the safe sector dominates entrepreneurial activity and even the skilled agents sets µ = 1. To
the right, the reverse is true and optimal allocation of saving involves µ = 0.25
As it is stated in the text, the first-order condition for n can be solved to obtain
µt = 1− (2− ρ)
St(1− ρ) nt ψ ≡ Γ(nt). (12)
This relation represents the combinations of n and µ, which ensure the first-order condition
for n is satisfied (see Figure 9(b)). The vertical intercept is Γ(0) = 1 because it can only
be optimal to open no risky sectors if no resources are devoted to risky investment (µ = 1).
As long as ρ is less than one this relationship is strictly decreasing and satisfies Γ(n∗) = 0
where n∗ = St
1−ρ
(2−ρ)ψ .
The corner solution µ = 1 and n = 0 always satisfies the first-order conditions. For there
to be an interior solution for n the Γ(n) line must intersect the horizontal axis in the region
where µ = 0 is the optimal choice, i.e., n∗ > n¯. If this is the case, the choice µ = 0 and
n = n∗ satisfies the first-order conditions. This is illustrated in Figure 10.
2. The Log Case
Suppose now that the lifetime utility function of any agent is given by
U = log(cy) + β log(co), (13)
where cy, co represent the agent’s consumption when young and old, respectively. The
parameter β ∈ (0, 1) is its discount of the future.
25We assume that for n = n¯ the agent chooses µ = 0.
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(a) Optimal µ (b) Optimal n
Fig. 9: Determination of Optimal µ (Panel a) and n (Panel b).
(a) Interior n (b) No interior n
Fig. 10: Panel (a): Interior solution for n exists. Panel (b): No interior solution for n.
2.1. Unskilled Agents
The problem of an unskilled young agent then becomes:
max
cy ,cLo ,c
U
o ,µ,n
log(cy) + β
{ n
N
log(cLo ) +
(
1− n
N
)
log(cUo )
}
(14)
cy + S = w
cLo =
{
Au[(1− µ)S − ψn]
nρ
+ µSφ
}
cUo = µSφ,
where cLo , c
U
o represent consumption of the old agent in the lucky and unlucky states of
the world, respectively. As before, by ”lucky” we mean that one of the sectors that the old
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Fig. 11: The effect of an increase in ψ
agent operates becomes productive. The first constraint indicates that in the first period the
available resources, i.e., wages can be used to either consume or save for the future. The two
additional constraints are identical to those of the linear case presented in the main text.
Since we assume unskilled agents are unproductive in the risky sector (Au = 0) the
solution to this problem is:
µ∗ = 1 and S∗ =
βw
1 + β
. (15)
Unskilled agents still choose to operate only the safe technology, i.e., they invest all their
funds in the safe technology and they save a constant fraction of their wages for the next
period.
2.2. Skilled Agents
The problem of a skilled young agent is:
max
cy ,cLo ,c
U
o ,µ,n
log(cy) + β
{ n
N
log(cLo ) +
(
1− n
N
)
log(cUo )
}
(16)
cy + S = w
cLo =
As[(1− µ)S − ψn]
nρ
+ µSφ
cUo = µSφ.
The solution to this problem is given by:
µ∗ =
As(N − n)(S − ψn))
SN(AS − φnρ) and S
∗ =
βw + ψn
1 + β
. (17)
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It is not possible to obtain a closed-form solution for the optimal value of n. However,
through numerical simulation, it is easy to confirm that it is indeed inversely related to
ψ. The other important point to establish is that increases in ψ increase the amount of
resources invested per risky sector – i.e., that the “concentration effect” of the linear case it
is also present here. The extra capital from a risky sector that pays off is As
(
(1−µ)S−ψ n
nρ
)
.
In our simple model s was exogenous, µ = 0 for the skilled agents, and n was proportional
to 1/ψ so that nψ was independent of ψ . Thus it was easy to see that if greater barriers
lead to fewer sectors being operated, they must also necessarily lead to more resources being
allocated to each. To confirm that this is true in the endogenous saving and log utility case,
we again resort to numerical calculations. There are several effects at work now. First,
because of risk aversion an increase in ψ, and the subsequent reduction in n will, lead to a
lower fraction of resources allocated to risky sectors (1 − µ will fall). On the other hand,
because of a precautionary motive, saving will increase (S will rise). These two effects work
in opposite directions so that the total resources allocated to risky sectors (1−µ)S does not
change much with ψ. A similar result holds for nψ, which, unlike in the linear case with an
exogenous saving rate, is not independent of ψ but again the two terms move in opposite
directions. All this means that the numerator of µ∗ does not vary much with ψ and the
nρ in the denominator dominates. We conclude from numerical calculations that, for most
parameter values, increases in ψ increase the amount of resources 1−µ invested in the lower
number of opened risky sectors.
3. Full Dynamics
There exists a threshold level of capital K∗ such that for capital beyond it, wages and
savings are high enough so that n∗ > N and all sectors are operated regardless of the entry
cost. This can be seen from equation (9) and by observing that wages and thus savings S
increase with capital stock. This threshold is, of course, increasing with the level of barriers,
that is dK∗/dψ > 0.
Figure 12 shows the complete characterization of the KL(Kt) schedule for two economies
with different levels of entry costs (the KU(Kt) schedule is omitted). The solid line is for the
economy with low barriers (ψL), while the dashed line is for the economy with high barriers
(ψH). For K above each of the thresholds, the curves become steeper and have a negative
intercept (they can be obtained by substituting n∗ for N in equation (10)). Dynamics are
given by the outer envelope of the two curves (bold portion of the two curves in the figure).
For economies that are below the cutoff (not all sectors are operated), the KL(Kt) schedule
of the economy with higher barriers (dashed line) is above the one for an economy with lower
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Fig. 12: The KL(Kt) Schedule
Notes. Complete characterization of the KL(Kt) schedule for two economies with different levels of entry
costs. The solid line is for the economy with low barriers (ψL) while the dashed line is for the economy with
high barriers (ψH).
barriers (solid line), as was discussed in the main text. For fully diversified economies (those
that operate all N sectors) the KL(Kt) schedule is always higher for the one with lower
entry costs. This indicates that higher barriers of entry are bad for capital accumulation
and growth once the economy is fully diversified. Figure 13(a) illustrates a case in which an
economy with high barriers (non-democracy) never reaches fully diversification because the
critical threshold is to the right of its steady state. Figure 13(b), in contrast, represents an
economy with low barriers (democracy) that eventually converges to a deterministic steady
state (i.e., one with a fully diversified production sector).
43
(a) Non-Democracy (High ψ) (b) Democracy (Low ψ)
Fig. 13: Medium term growth reversals. Panel (a): Non-Democracy; Panel (b):Democracy.
